Introduction
How can environmental externalities be internalized by a firm? The recent offshore oil spill by British Petroleum and the tremendous environmental and economic damage caused by the oil spill reemphasizes the need for an understanding of this question. Some of the mechanisms currently being debated in the U.S. are carbon tax, instituting a cap and trade program and imposing tough new regulations on the environmental performance of the firms. Apart from the possibility of regulation, there is an increase in socially responsible investing (SRI) that attempts to screen stocks based on undesirable characteristics such as the nature of business, amount of pollution, and climate change concerns. If a sufficiently large number of shareholders abstain from investing in firms based on environmental concerns, the expected return for these firms would increase (Merton (1987) , Heinkel, Kraus and Zechner (2001) ) and this increase could potentially impact the behavior of the firms on the environmental dimension. Motivated by these theoretical arguments, in this paper, I analyze whether investors demand higher expected stock returns from firms that are excluded by the environmental screens widely used by socially responsible investors.
1
The amount of money devoted to socially responsible investing has increased steadily over the last few years with a growth of 324% over the 1995-2007 time period and over fifty times in the last twenty years. Social Investing Forum reports that one in nine dollars ($2.71 trillion out of $25.1 trillion under management in the United States) are under socially responsible investing guidelines. In addition to screening out undesirable stocks, investors can attempt to influence the environmental policies of firms through shareholder proposals and lobbying the management.
2 For example, Landier and Nair (2009) report that during 2007, 331 out of 1150 shareholder resolutions that were filed are socially oriented. As Carleton, Nelson and Weisbach (1998) document, it is not necessary for institutions to a get majority vote on the shareholder resolutions in order to push the companies to adopt the changes. If SRI can make a difference, it can complement laws, regulations and taxes in promoting environmentally sustainable corporate behavior.
In a recent paper, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) this is the first paper that directly analyzes whether investors demand a higher expected return from stocks of firms with environmental concerns.
A firm's environmental profile encompasses two broad areas of concerns and strengths: One area includes the environmental issues that are already regulated and required to be reported by the U.S. government (for example, the emission of toxic chemicals and hazardous waste). The other area includes environmental strengths and concerns in areas that are not yet regulated by the government, but where there is a possibility of regulation or increased sensitivity by the investors. Emissions of green house gases and carbon footprint of the firm fall into this category.
In this paper, I analyze the relationship between a firm's strengths and weaknesses in these areas and the cost of capital.
I analyze the impact of the environmental profile of the firm on the expected stock returns using the implied cost of capital (ICC) computed from analysts' earnings estimate as a proxy for the ex-ante expected stock returns (see Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001) , Pastor, Sinha and Swaminathan (2007) and Chava and Purnanandam (2009) for more details about ICC and the advantages of using ICC as a proxy for expected returns instead of realized returns). ICC is especially an attractive proxy for expected returns in light of the contradictory results in the literature on investment performance of socially responsible firms and other firms using realized returns (for example, Statman and Glushkov (2008) find no difference, Brammer, Brook and Pavelin (2008) find underperformance and Kempf and Osthoff (2007) find higher performance).
ICC relies more on cross-sectional variation across the firms and hence is a better proxy for expected returns in the current setting (as compared to using ex-post realized returns) given the short-sample period for which data on the environmental concerns are available. Further, unlike measuring abnormal performance using realized returns, ICC doesn't depend on a particular asset pricing model.
Using ICC computed from the analysts' estimates, I find that there is a statistically and economically significant positive relationship between the net environmental concerns of the firm and the expected returns on its stock. In contrast, there is no meaningful relationship between expected returns and number of environmental strengths of the firm. In a similar vein, investors seem to demand a significantly higher return on stocks of firms that have a higher climate concern score (defined as climate concern score minus clean energy strength). These results lend support to the view that socially responsible investing has an impact on stock prices consistent with the theoretical prediction of Merton (1987) and , Heinkel, Kraus and Zechner (2001) . Socially responsible investors appear to screen out stocks with environmental concerns.
My analysis individual environmental concerns indicates that investors seem to expect higher returns from stocks of firms that are significant emitters of toxic chemicals and those with hazardous waste concerns. I also find that there is a very strong positive relationship between expected returns and climate change concerns. This is especially interesting given that greenhouse gas emissions are not currently regulated. This suggests that socially responsible investors screen out firms based on this filter and that affects the expected stock returns of these firms.
These results are also consistent with Hong and Kostovetsky (2009) Merton (1987) and Heinkel, Kraus and Zechner (2001) and suggest that if a sufficiently large number of shareholders abstain from investing in certain firms based on environmental and other concerns, the expected return for these firms would increase.
My paper is related to Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly (2005) , Hong and Kacperczyk (2009 ), Hong and Kostovetsky (2009 ), Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn (2009 ) , Fernando, Sharfman and Uysal (2010 and . Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly (2005) find that while firms that violate 3 After controlling for the following variables based on the specification in Hong, Kubik and Sten (2008) : market capitalization of the firm, market to book ratio, beta of the firm's stock, inverse of the firm's stock price, mean monthly return of the firm's stock return over the past one year, volatility of the firm's stock return and a dummy for S&P500 membership and a dummy for whether the firm is listed on NASDAQ environmental laws suffer statistically significant losses in the market value of firm equity, the losses, however, are of similar magnitudes to the legal penalties imposed.
I build on the work of Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) In a related paper, studies the impact of the environmental profile of a firm on the cost of its private debt capital. An interesting question for future research is whether this increased cost of capital fully internalizes the firm's environemntal externalities and whether it is sufficient to change the firm's environmental footprint.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the data and variables used. The empirical results are presented in Section 3. Section 4 explores why investors demand higher returns from firms with environmental concerns. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
Data and Construction of Variables

Environmental Strength Measures
The individual environmental strengths are also coded as a dummy variable that is coded as one if the firm has that particular environmental strength for that year and zero otherwise.
benproduct is a dummy that takes the value of one if the company derives substantial revenues from innovative remediation products, environmental services, or products that promote the efficient use of energy, or if the company has developed innovative products with environmental benefits. But this does not include services with questionable environmental effects, such as landfills, incinerators, waste-to-energy plants, and deep injection wells. polprevent is coded as one if the company has notably strong pollution prevention programs including both emissions reductions and toxic-use reduction programs. cleanenergy is coded as one if the company has taken significant measures to reduce its impact on climate change and air pollution through use of renewable energy and clean fuels or through energy efficiency or if the company has demonstrated a commitment to promoting climate-friendly policies and practices outside its own operations. envcomm is a dummy variable that is coded as one if the company is a signatory to the CERES Principles, publishes a notably substantive environmental report, or has notably effective internal communications systems in place for environmental best practices. KLD began assigning strengths for this issue in 1996.
Summary Measures of Environmental Concerns and Strengths
In addition to the individual concerns and strengths described in detail later in this section 5 , the database also provides a count of the total number of environmental concerns (numconcerns) for the firm and the total number of environmental strengths (numstrength) for the firm. I also construct a net measure of environmental concerns (netconcerns) defined as numconcernsnumstrength and a measure of exposure to climate change defined as climchange-cleanenergy.
Descriptive statistics for the environmental concerns and strengths of the firm are presented in Panels C, D and E of Table 1 . The mean value of the netconcerns measure is 0.16. On average, firms have more environmental concerns than environmental strengths with the average value of environmental concerns at 0.37 and the average value of environmental strengths at 0.21. 9.87%
of firms have a hazardous waste concerns and 7% of firms have climate change concerns.
Analyst Estimates for ICC computation
I/B/E/S database is the source for the analyst consensus estimates for one-year and two-year ahead forecast of earnings per share and long-term consensus growth forecast required to compute the implied cost of capital (ICC) used as a proxy for expected returns in this paper. ICC is computed as the internal rate of return that equates the present value of free cash flows to equity to current stock price. I closely follow Lee, Gebhardt and Swaminathan (2001), Pastor, Sinha and Swaminthan (2007) , and Chava and Purnanandam (2009) for the construction of the ICC measure.
I compute the ICC using the discounted cash flow model of equity valuation. In this approach, the expected return on a stock is computed as the internal rate of return that equates the present value of free cash flows to the current price. The stock price P i,t of firm i at time t is given by:
where F CF E i,t+k is the free cash flow to equity of firm i in year t + k, E t is the expectation operator conditional on the information at time t and r i,e is the ICC.
Equation 1 models current stock price as the discounted sum of all future cash-flows. I explicitly forecast cash flows for the next T = 15 years and capture the effect of subsequent cash flows using a terminal value calculation. We estimate the free cash-flow to equity of firm i in year t + k using
where F E i,t+k is the earnings estimate of firm i in year t + k and b t+k is its plowback rate.
F E i,t+k is estimated using the earnings forecast available from the I/B/E/S database. I use one-year and two-year ahead consensus (median) forecasts as proxies for F E i,t+1 and F E i,t+2 , respectively. I compute the earnings estimate for year t+3 by multiplying the year t+2 estimate by the consensus long-term growth forecast. I/B/E/S provides the long-term consensus growth forecast for most firms. In the case of missing data, I compute the growth rate using earnings forecasts for years t + 1 and t + 2. I assign a value of 100% to firms with a growth rate above 100% and 2% to firms with a growth rate below 2% to avoid the outlier problems. I forecast earnings from year t + 4 to t + T + 1 by mean-reverting the year t + 3 earnings growth rate to a steady long-run value by year t + T + 2. The steady state growth rate of a firm's earnings is assumed to be the GDP growth rate (g) as of the previous year. The growth rate for year t + k is assumed to follow
Using these growth rates, we compute earnings as follows:
Next I compute the plowback rate (i.e., one minus the payout ratio) from the most recent fiscal year data. The payout is defined as the sum of dividends (DVC) and share repurchases (PRSTKC) minus any issuance of new equity (SSTK). I get the payout ratio by dividing this number by net income (IB) if it is positive. If we are unable to compute the plowback ratio based on this method, then I set it to the industry (two-digit SIC Code) median payout ratio.
If the payout ratio of a firm is above 1 or below -0.5, I set it to the industry median payout ratio as well. I use the plowback ratio computed using the above procedure for the first year of estimation and mean-revert it to a steady state value by year t + T + 1. The steady state formula assumes that the product of the return on new investments ROI and the plowback rate is equal to the growth rate in earnings in steady state (i.e., g = ROI * b in steady-state). I set ROI for new investments to r e under the assumption that competition drives returns on new investments to the cost of equity. With these assumptions, the plowback rate for year t + k (k = 2, 3, ...T ) is given by the following:
I compute terminal value as the following perpetuity:
Collecting all the terms, I get the following equation that I solve for r i,e to get the ICC. : 
Control variables
The specification for the ICC regressions is based on Lee, Gebhardt, Swaminathan (2001) any staleness in analyst forecasts and show that the past stock return is a significant predictor of the expected return on the stock. Based on these papers, I include the following firm level variables in the regressions: firm's size measured as the log of book assets of the firm (logta), market-to-book ratio of the firm (mtb), book leverage (booklev ), stock return volatility of the firm over the past one year (stdret) and past one month's stock return of the firm (ret t−1,t ).
The sources of firm characteristics is Standard and Poor's quarterly COMPUSTAT database.
Market data is from CRSP. All financial data is lagged by at least six months so that it is available at the time of ICC construction (June 30 of each year). Further, all financial data is winsorized at 1% and 99% to handle outliers. 
Empirical Results
Empirical Methodology
Aggregate Environmental Concerns and Expected Equity Returns
In Table 2 I In models 5 and 6, I include climchange, a dummy variable that measures whether the firm derives substantial revenues from the sale of coal or oil and its derivative products. climchange has a significantly positive effect on the expected returns of the firm. The result is robust to the inclusion of industry fixed effects in Model 6. The expected return on the stocks of firms with climate change concerns are 0.43% to 0.66% higher compared to firms with no such concern. Of the individual environmental concerns variables considered, the impact of the climate change concerns is the highest.
The results demonstrate that investors care about the environmental concerns of the firm but not all environment concerns are equally weighed. Interestingly, climate change concerns that proxy for the green house gas emissions of the firm and the carbon footprint of the firm seem to have the most impact even though they are not regulated yet. This may be caused in part by socially responsible investing that screens out stocks with climate change concerns or the anticipated costs of future regulation. The cost of anticipated future regulation may include compliance costs and costs of litigation that may arise from the new rules. 
Individual Environmental Strengths and Expected Equity Returns
Robustness of the ICC results
So far, I have analyzed the impact of individual concerns and strengths separately on the expected returns. In Models 1 and 2 of Table 5 , I include all the environmental concerns in the same specification. The results are similar to those in Table 3 with the exception of substantial emission concern that loses significance in the specification with industry effects. As mentioned before, it is to be expected that substantial emissions concerns and hazardous chemical concerns would be positively correlated. In Models 3 and 4, all the environmental strengths of the firm are included in the specification and results are similar to the results in Table 4 . None of the environmental strengths have a significant effect on the expected returns. In Models 7 and 8, all the environmental concerns and strengths are included in the specification and the results are similar to the results in earlier models in this table and those in Table 3 and Table 4 . I used the past one month's stock return to control for any staleness in analyst's forecasts (Chava and Purnanandam (2009) 
Why do investors expect higher stock returns from firms with environmental concerns?
The results documented in the previous three tables show that there is a strong positive relationship between expected returns and environmental concerns measures but there seems to be no statistically significant relationship between expected returns and environmental strengths (except clean energy). Why would investors demand a higher expected return from stocks of firms with environmental concerns? The natural possibility is that investors consider firms with environmental concerns as more risky compared to firms without these environmental concerns.
Investors may be pricing in the possibility of future regulation and the costs of compliance or costs associated with potential litigation for firms with the environmental concerns. The regressions already include controls for important determinants of firm risk such as size and market-to-book ratio. In unreported tests, the inclusion of the firm's stock beta didn't have an effect on the results. I also included proxies for default risk such as size, leverage and volatilty (Shumway (2001) and Chava and Jarrow (2004) ). However, it is possible that there is an omitted component of firm specific risk (not captured by the control variables in the regression) and this omitted risk factor could be driving the observed relationship with expected returns. Chava (2010) presents evidence that firms with environmental concerns are not more likely to file for bankruptcy compared to firms without these environmental concerns. But, it is a challenging task to conclusively rule out the possibility that an omitted risk factor that is not captured by the conventional variables used in the implied cost of capital regressions could be driving the result.
Another distinct possibility is that socially responsible investors screen out stocks with environmental concerns. If a large number of investors use environmental screens to screen out stocks considered undesirable based on environmental concerns and hence do not invest in stocks of firms with environmental concerns, socially responsible investing can then have an impact on the stock price and the expected returns of the stocks (Merton (1987) and, Heinkel, Kraus and
Zechner (2001)). I present some initial evidence that is consistent with this hypothesis in Table   6 and Table 7 .
In order to understand whether socially responsible investing is the driver behind the observed positive relationship between environmental concerns and expected stock returns, I analyze the relationship between total institutional ownership in the firm and the firm's environmental profile in Table 6 . The key dependent variable is the total institutional ownership in the firms' stock, expressed as a percentage of the shares outstanding of the firm 6 . The data source for the institutional ownership is Thomson 13-F data. I closely follow Hong and Karparcyzk (2010) and Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008) for the regression specifications. In the interest of space, I present only the coefficients on individual environmental concerns and strengths but all the regressions include market capitalization of the firm, market to book ratio, beta of the firm's stock, inverse of the firm's stock price, mean monthly return of the firm's stock return over the past one year, volatility of the firm's stock return, a dummy for S&P500 membership and a dummy for whether the firm is listed on NASDAQ).
Results presented in Model 1 of Table 6 show that firms with environmental concerns such hazardous waste concerns, substantial emission concerns and climate change concerns have significantly lower institutional ownership compared to firms that don't have these environmental concerns. Interestingly, a firm that has concerns on all these environmental dimensions has approximately 14%-15% lower institutional ownership, roughly in line with the percentage of dollars invested in socially responsible investing. Other models in Table 6 indicate that the percentage of institutional ownership is not higher for firms with environmental strengths. In fact, firms with clean energy and environmental communications strengths have significantly lower institutional ownership.
In the next table, Table 7 , I consider the natural logarithm of number of institutional owners as the key independent variable. The regression specification remains the same as in institutional ownership regressions. The results are also similar indicating that firms with environmental concerns such as hazardous waste and climate change concerns are held by significantly lower number of institutional owners compared to firms that do not have these environmental concerns.
Results presented in Table 6 and Table 7 are consistent with the results presented in Table 3 and Table 4 that there is a significant positive relationship between expected stock returns and environmental concerns and that there is no meaningful relationship between environmental strengths of the firm and expected stock returns. These results provide some evidence that socially responsible investors impact the expected stock returns of firms with environmental concerns by screening out the stocks of these firms. While it is difficult to conclusively rule out the risk story, the observed lower institutional ownership for firms with environmental concerns suggests that an omitted risk factor may not be exclusively driving investors demand for higher expected stock returns from stocks with environmental concerns.
Conclusion
In this paper, I provide evidence that investors expect significantly higher returns on stocks of firms with environmental concerns. Notably, expected returns on stocks with climate change concerns are significantly higher indicating that even though green house gas emissions are not currently regulated, investors do seem to take these issues into account. While I cannot completely rule out that this is driven by perceived regulation risk in the future, I provide some preliminary evidence that the observed positive relationship between expected stock returns and firm's environmental concerns is partly driven by socially responsible investors screening out stocks with environmental concerns. The results suggest that exclusionary socially responsible investing can cause firms to internalize environmental externalities by prompting the firms to adopt more environmentally friendly policies.
Appendix: Variable Definitions Firm Characteristics
• logta refers to the natural logarithm of total book assets of the firm in billions of USD.
• mtb is the market-to-book ratio of the firm.
• booklev measures the leverage of the firm constructed as the ratio of total debt (sum of long-term-and short-term-debt) scaled by the total assets of the firm.
• stdret is the standard deviation of firm's daily stock returns over the past year.
• ret t−1,t represents the firm's past one month stock return.
Environmental Concerns and Strengths Variables
• numconcerns measures the total number of environmental concerns for the firm recorded in the KLD database
• numstrength, the total number of environmental strengths for the firm recorded in the KLD database.
• netconcerns is a net measure of environmental concerns and is constructed as numconcernsnumstrength.
• climscore is constructed as the difference of climate change concerns (climchange) and clean energy strength (cleanenergy).
• hazardwaste is a dummy variable that is coded as one if the company's liabilities for hazardous waste sites exceed $50 million, or if the company has recently paid substantial fines or civil penalties for waste management violations.
• substemission is coded as one if the company's legal emissions of toxic chemicals (as defined by and reported to the EPA) from individual plants into the air and water are among the highest of the companies followed by KLD.
• climchange is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the company derives substantial revenues from the sale of coal or oil and its derivative fuel products, or if the company derives substantial revenues indirectly from the combustion of coal or oil and its derivative fuel products.
• benproduct is a dummy that takes the value of one if the company derives substantial revenues from innovative remediation products, environmental services, or products that promote the efficient use of energy, or it has developed innovative products with environmental benefits. But this does not include services with questionable environmental effects, such as landfills, incinerators, waste-to-energy plants, and deep injection wells.
• polprevent is a coded as one if the company has notably strong pollution prevention programs including both emissions reductions and toxic-use reduction programs.
• cleanenergy is coded as one if the company has taken significant measures to reduce its impact on climate change and air pollution through use of renewable energy and clean fuels or through energy efficiency or if the company has demonstrated a commitment to promoting climate-friendly policies and practices outside its own operations.
• envcomm is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the company is a signatory to the CERES Principles, publishes a notably substantive environmental report, or has notably effective internal communications systems in place for environmental best practices. Hong and Karparcyzk (2009) . The control variables in the regression but whose coefficients are not presented in the table include log (market capitalization of the firm), log(market to book ratio of the firm), beta of the firms' stock computed from daily returns over the past one year, inverse of the stock price of the firm at the end of the fiscal year, mean monthly stock return over the past one year, volatility of daily stock returns over the past one year, indicator variable for whether the firm is a member of S&P500, and indicator variable for whether the firm is listed in NASDAQ. Hong and Karparcyzk (2009) . The control variables in the regression but whose coefficients are not presented in the table include log (market capitalization of the firm), log(market to book ratio of the firm), beta of the firms' stock computed from daily returns over the past one year, inverse of the stock price of the firm at the end of the fiscal year, mean monthly stock return over the past one year, volatility of daily stock returns over the past one year, indicator variable for whether the firm is a member of S&P500, and indicator variable for whether the firm is listed in NASDAQ. 
